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Abstract
This article addresses three hypotheses: (1) only a minority of Canadian student loan borrowers experience
severe difficulty in repaying their student loans; (2) those who default on their student loans do so largely
because they cannot pay, rather than because they do not want to pay; and (3) for Canadians who are filing for
bankruptcy and who have student loans among their debts, bankruptcy is a last resort, and their economic
situation is more difficult than that of the average person seeking bankruptcy protection. A review of the
literature strongly supports the first two hypotheses; a new analysis of a 1997 survey of debtors seeking
bankruptcy protection supports the third. The author concludes that most debtors with student loans among
their debts are not behaving opportunistically in seeking bankruptcy; bankruptcy is indeed a last resort. The
article questions whether recent legislative changes, which impose a ten-year waiting period before allowing
the discharge of student loan debt through bankruptcy, are motivated by an assumption of opportunistic
behaviour on the part of student loan borrowers. The author believes those changes are unwise and
unnecessary.
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THE DARK SIDE OF STUDENT
LOANS: DEBT BURDEN, DEFAULT,
AND BANKRUPTCY©
BY SAUL SCHWARTZ*
This article addresses three hypotheses: (1) only a
minority of Canadian student loan borrowers
experience severe difficulty in repaying their student
loans; (2) those who default on their student loans do
so largely because they cannot pay, rather than because
they do not want to pay; and (3) for Canadians who are
filing for bankruptcy and who have student loans
among their debts, bankruptcy is a last resort, and their
economic situation is more difficult than that of the
average person seeking bankruptcy protection. A
review of the literature strongly supports the first two
hypotheses; a new analysis of a 1997 survey of debtors
seeking bankruptcy protection supports the third. The
author concludes that most debtors with student loans
among their debts are not behaving opportunistically in
seeking bankruptcy; bankruptcy is indeed a last resort.
The article questions whether recent legislative
changes, which impose a ten-year waiting period before
allowing the discharge of student loan debt through
bankruptcy, are motivated by an assumption of
opportunistic behaviour on the part of student loan
borrowers. The author believes those changes are
unwise and unnecessary.
Cet article r6pond A trois hypotheses: (1) seulement
une minorit6 d'6tudiants en tant qu'emprunteurs ont
d'6normes difficult6s A repayer leurs dettes; (2) si
certains sont en d~faut de rembourser leurs emprunts,
e'est plut6t parce qu'ils ne peuvent pas et non parce
qu'ils ne veulent pas le faire; et (3) pour les Canadiens
qui sont en instance de faillite et qui ont des emprunts
d'6tudiants dans leurs dettes, la faillite est leur dernier
recours, et leur situation 6conomique est plus difficile
que celle de la moyenne des gens qui cherchent la
protection de la faillite. Une relecture de ]a
documentation soutient bien les deux premieres
hypothbses; une nouvelle analyse d'une 6tude r.alis~e
en 1997 sur les d6biteurs cherchant une protection de la
faillite, soutient Ia troisi~me. L'auteur en conclut que la
plupart des d6biteurs qui ont des emprunts d'1tudiants
dans leurs dettes, ne se comportent pas de fagon
opportuniste en cherchant la protection; la faillite est
en fait leur dernier recours. L'article se demande si les
changements I6gislatifs r~cents, qui imposent une
p.riode d'attente de dix ants avant de permettre de
d6charger les emprunts d'6tudiants des dettes A travers
la faillite, sont motiv6s par la pr~somption d'un
comportement opportuniste de la part des dbiteurs.
L'auteur croit que ces changements ne sont ni prudents
ni ncessaires.
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 308
A. Background .............................................................. 309
II. HOW MANY BORROWERS EXPERIENCE FINANCIAL HARDSHIP
IN REPAYING THEIR LOANS? .............................................. 312
© 1999, S. Schwartz.
Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, Carleton University; Director of
Research, The Social Research and Demonstration Corporation. This article is a substantially
revised version of the paper presented by the author at the Conference on the Contemporary
Challenges of Consumer Bankruptcies in a Comparative Context, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto, 21-22 August 1998.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL, 37 NOS. I & 2
A. Early Efforts to Quantify Financial Hardship .................................... 314
B. Measuring Hardship Using Survey Data ........................................ 314
C. Measuring Hardship Using Administrative Data ................................. 317
III. WHY DO STUDENTS DEFAULT? ........................................... 318
A. Borrowers'Inability to Pay ................................................... 319
B. Knowledge andAttitudes .................................................... 321
C. Incentives for Default Created by Program Rules ................................. 322
1. Eligibility rules .......................................................... 323
2. Due diligence rules .................. : ................................... 323
3. Lack of flexible repayment plans ........................................... 324
4. Consequences of default .................................................. 324
IV. THE SITUATION OF BANKRUPTS WITH
STUDENT LOANS AMONG THEIR DEBTS ................................... 325
A. Demographic Characteristics ................................................. 326
B. The Economic Situation of Bankrupts With Student Loan Debt ..................... 327
C. Summary ................................................................ 330
V. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES THAT RELATE
TO STUDENT LOAN BORROWERS ......................................... 330
A. Changes to the CSLP Interest Relief Program and "Debt Reduction"for CSLP Loans .. 334
B. Tax Credits forAll Student Loan Borrowers ..................................... 336
C. New Grant Programs ....................................................... 337
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 337
I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, I discuss three hypotheses: (1) only a minority of
Canadian student loan borrowers experience severe difficulty in repaying
their student loans; (2) those who default on their student loans do so
largely because they cannot pay, rather. than because they do not want to
pay; and (3) for Canadians who are filing for bankruptcy and who have
student loans among their debts, bankruptcy is a last resort; their
economic situation is even more difficult than that of the average person
seeking bankruptcy protection.
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The first two hypotheses are supported by a review of previous
research.1 The third relies on evidence from a survey of Canadians who
filed for personal bankruptcy in 1997.2 After presenting the evidence
relating to the three hypotheses, I then discuss recent important
legislative changes that affect the student loan systems.
A. Background
More than 40 per cent of Canadian young people are enrolled in
post-secondary schools. That percentage is higher than in the United
States, higher than in the United Kingdom and, in fact, higher than in
any other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) country.3 In 1995-1996, roughly 960,000 Canadians were full-time
students in colleges or universities. 4
1 Parts I and II of the article are drawn from literature reviews written for Human Resources
Development Canada (HRDC). These literature reviews were part of an evaluation of the Canada
Student Loan Program (CSLP), conducted by Goss Gilroy Inc. on behalf of HRDC: see Human
Resources Development Canada, Evaluation of the Canada Student Loan Program: Final Report
(Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada, 1997), online: Human Resources Development
Canada <http://198.103.247.24/ edd/CSL.lhtml> (date accessed: 11 September 1999) [hereinafter
Evaluation: Final Report]. The first review dealt with student loan default: see S. Schwartz & S.
Phillips, Student Loan Default (1996) [unpublished, on file with author]; the second review dealt
more generally with the issues related to student loan borrowing: see S. Schwartz, Evaluation of the
Canada Student Loans Program: Literature Review (1996) [unpublished, on file with author].
2 See S. Schwartz & L. Anderson, An Empirical Study of Canadians Seeking Personal
Bankruptcy Protection (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1998), online: Industry Canada <http://strategis.ic.
gc.ca/SSG/ca00889e.html> (date accessed: 11 June 1999) [hereinafter Empirical Study]. This report
was the work of myself and Leigh Anderson of Carleton University, and was derived from our
survey of bankrupts: see S. Schwartz & L. Anderson, 1997 Survey of Potential Bankrupts (1997)
[unpublished, on file with author] [hereinafter Survey of Potential Bankrupts]. The actual survey
process was undertaken with the assistance of Steve Kiar of COMPAS Inc., an Ottawa survey
research firm.
3 The percentages are for young people, aged 18-21, in countries that are members of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): see Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators (Paris: Organization for
Economic Co-operation And Development, 1996) at 126-27.
4 See Canada, Federal and Provincial Support to Post-Secondary Education: A Report to
Parliament 1991192-1995196 (Ottawa: Department of the Secretary of State, 1997) at 29-30. Of the
960,000 students, 387,000 were enrolled in colleges and 573,000 in universities; another 433,000
Canadians were studying on a part-time basis (160,000 in colleges and 273,000 in universities).
These totals do not include students in private colleges or in short-term trade and vocational
programs. Statistics Canada estimated that there were 306,000 such students at one point in time
during the 1993-1994 academic year: see Statistics Canada, Education in Canada (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 1996). As these programs are relatively short, the number of students enrolled in them over
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A substantial proportion of Canadian post-secondary students
borrow from government-subsidized loan programs in order to help
finance their schooling. In 1995-1996, 321,000 students borrowed from
the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP), and more borrowed from
provincial loan programs.5
The job market faced by young people after leaving school is
complex and uncertain. For those who graduate from college and
university programs, employment and earnings have been relatively
strong and stable over time. According to the National Graduates
Surveys (NGS), 80 per cent of those who graduated from bachelor degree
programs in 1982, 1986, or 1990 were working full-time five years after
graduation.6 Over time, the full-time earnings of the graduates were
consistently high.7 Thus, post-secondary education continues to pay off
for at least some young people. The growth of post-secondary
enrolments through the early 1990s, despite declining numbers of young
people in the population, confirms that impression.8
Two other factors, however, bear on this situation. The first is
that, since the 1980s, the earnings of young people have, on the whole,
been falling. As the average earnings of post-secondary graduates has
been stable, it would seem that the earnings of the large number of
young people who have some post-secondary education, but no post-
secondary degree, have been declining. The second factor is that a
significant minority of graduates work-at least initially-in jobs that do
the course of a year may be larger than that estimate.
5 Students in all approved post-secondary programs are eligible to borrow from the CrSLp
(subject to provincial needs assessment). Approved programs include public colleges and
universities, as well as private colleges and short-term vocational programs. Since we do not know
the number of students in private colleges and short-term vocational programs (see note 4, supra),
we do not know the number of eligible students and, therefore, do not know the proportion of all
eligible students who borrow.
6 See M. Paju, The Class of '90 Revisited: Report of the 1995 Follow-up Survey of 1990 Graduates
(Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada, 1997) at 9-10.
7 Across the three cohorts, male graduates had (in constant 1990 dollars) average full-time
earnings in the $33,000-$34,000 range, while female graduates had average full-time earnings in the
$29,000-$30,000 range: see R. Finnie & S. Schwartz, Student Loans in Canada: An Economic
Analysis of Borrowing and Repayment Using the National Graduates Surveys (Ottawa: Human
Resources Development Canada, 1996) Table 3.
8 The number of Canadians between the ages of 15 and 24 was roughly 4.5 million in 1985.
The number had fallen to roughly 4 million in 1990, and remained at that level in 1995: see G.
Betcherman & N. Leckie, Youth Employment and Education Trends in the 1980s and 1990s (Ottawa:
Canadian Policy Research Networks, 1997) at 3. The proportion of each age group enrolled in
colleges and universities has also risen over time. For example, according to Gordon Betcherman
and Norman Leckie, 17.2 per cent of those between the ages of 18 and 21 were enrolled in
university in 1993-1994, compared to 15.7 per cent in 1989-1990. College enrolment rates rose as
well: ibid. at28.
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not require a post-secondary education. Richard Marquardt reports that
"[a]mong male university graduates, 28% were working at jobs ... [that]
were primarily in clerical, sales, and service occupations, for example,
stock clerks, sales clerks, waiters, and security guards." 9 These trends
suggest that post-secondary education is a risky undertaking, with no
guarantee that the resources invested in it will bear fruit in the form of
better jobs and higher earnings.10
The cost to students of making an investment in post-secondary
education has risen substantially in recent years. The financial pressure
felt by post-secondary schools in the wake of federal and provincial
cutbacks has led schools to increase tuition fees sharply. The Statistics
Canada Tuition Fee Price Index has moved steadily upward during the
1990s,11 rising more quickly than the Consumer Price Index. 12 Thus,
post-secondary education is not only risky, but it is costlier than it once
was.
As tuition fees increased, so did the need for government-
subsidized student financial aid. Governments made that aid available,
but did so by increasing the amounts that students were allowed to
borrow from student loan programs. On the federal side, the CSLP loan
limit was increased by about 50 per cent in 1994. On the provincial side,
the provinces eliminated many of their grant programs in the early 1990s
and replaced them with loan programs.
The greater reliance on student loans creates two problems for
borrowers. First, the calculus of benefit and cost has changed for
students considering an investment in higher education. Some students,
who might have made the investment when grants were more widely
available, may potentially decide against attending school, or might leave
prematurely for financial reasons. Since the substitution of loans for
9 R. Marquardt, "Labour Market Participation, Employment and Unemployment" in High
School May Not Be Enough: An Analysis of Results From the School Leavers Follow-up Survey, 1995
(Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada, 1998) 29 at 37.
10 We cannot tell from the available research whether post-secondary education has become
more risky over time. For example, we do not know what has happened to either the level or the
variance in the rate of return to the different types of post-secondary education.
11 See, for example, T.M. Omiecinski, "Tuition and Living Accommodation Costs at Canadian
Universities, 1996-97" (1997) 4:1 Educ. Q. Rev. 92 at 92; 94, Table 1.
12 Ibid. at 95, Graph 1. Tuition fees, however, are not the major cost of post-secondary
schooling. The major economic cost is the earnings foregone by students. Since youth
unemployment rates have been relatively high in the 1990s, and since real average earnings have
fallen, the opportunity cost of the time spent in school has probably declined for many Canadians.
The magnitude of that decline is unknown, however, and thus cannot be compared to the increase
in tuition fees.
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grants primarily affects low-income Canadian youth-student aid is
based on family income-their access to post-secondary education may
be jeopardized.
Second, some of the students who decide to borrow in order to
obtain further education or training will not only incur significant costs,
but will also accumulate high debt loads. For them, the burden of debt
repayment may create severe financial problems when they leave school.
A third problem does not affect borrowers directly, but is
important nonetheless. Student loan programs are expensive. The cost
borne by the government has led to recent program changes and seems
likely to lead to more changes in the future. Student loans are subsidized
in two ways, both of which involve substantial costs to the federal and
provincial governments. First, the governments pay the interest on
student loans from the time the student borrows, until six months after
the student has left full-time studies. Second, governments bear some of
the costs of default. Depending on the loan program, the governments
either guarantee the loans (so that lenders are paid the value of
defaulted loans plus interest), or pay lenders a fee in lieu of a guarantee.
The focus of this article is on the second problem-the burden of
debt repayment.
II. HOW MANY BORROWERS EXPERIENCE FINANCIAL
HARDSHIP IN REPAYING THEIR LOANS?
Almost by definition, paying back a loan imposes a financial
burden on the borrower. The relevant question here is whether the
burden is so great as to threaten the financial well-being of the borrower.
Since student loans are offered to young people without any
consideration of their future ability to repay, fears about excessive
borrowing have been voiced ever since Canadian student loan programs
were introduced in the 1960s. In this section, I review previous research
on the extent to which former students are overburdened by their loans.
Efforts to measure how many student loan borrowers face
financial hardship as they attempt to repay their loans have had to deal
with two difficult issues. First, any definition of "financial hardship" is
inherently subjective. In the different, but related, context of assessing
the ability of potential bankrupts to pay their debts, Teresa Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook wrote:
"How many debtors can pay?" is in part a normative question: the answer depends on
moral and social value judgments.... All of us might prefer to skip paying our monthly
bills in favor of having a party or buying a new car, but we would hardly claim that this
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preference made us unable to pay. On the other hand, nearly all of us would agree that
an elderly widow with few assets, living on her social security, "can't pay" the massive
debts left by the failure of her late husband's business.13
Thus, there is no consensus on exactly what financial hardship
might mean. In a discussion of loan debt, Janet Hansen wrote that
"[r]esearchers have never been able to agree on what level of debt is
likely to be manageable for those who borrow to pay for college; given
this lack of consensus, it becomes difficult for policymakers to know if
and when the point of 'too much' borrowing is reached. 1 4
A second problem is that very few data sets are rich enough to
contain all debts that a former student might have incurred. Student
loan debts are only one of a number of debts by which young people
might be burdened. For example, many young people use credit cards
and might, therefore, have outstanding balances on them. Others borrow
to purchase automobiles and homes. As student loans may not be the
only loans that young people are trying to repay, individuals with
identical amounts of outstanding student loan debt might have quite
different debt repayment burdens. A person who might easily pay off
$10,000 in student loans, if that were his or her only debt, might be
struggling desperately to repay such a loan if accompanied by a $5,000
credit card balance and a $15,000 car loan. Without data on all debt
obligations, no measure of financial hardship can be complete.
Faced with these challenges, researchers have tried three general
lines of attack. First, an early group of studies estimated the proportion
of a typical starting salary that might reasonably be spent on debt
repayment and then compared that proportion to the amount required
to repay debts of various amounts. Second, researchers used survey data
either to calculate rough indicators of debt burden or to ask debtors
directly whether or not their loans were causing financial hardship.
Other researchers used survey data to approach the issue indirectly by
looking at various aspects of the economic situation of student loan
borrowers (such as their access to credit or their propensity to purchase
major consumer durables). Third, administrative data on the incidence
of student loan default and of bankruptcies involving student loans has
been analyzed on the assumption that default and bankruptcy indicate
financial hardship.
13 T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and
Consumer Credit in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 200 [hereinafterAs We
Forgive Our Debtors].
14 J.S. Hansen, "The Shifting Roles of Parents and Students" in J.P. Merisotis, ed., The
Changing Dimensions of StudentAid (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991) 21 at 25-26.
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A. Early Efforts to Quantify Financial Hardship
Early studies of the burden created by student loan repayment
relied largely on rough theoretical measures derived from aggregate
borrowing patterns.!S Summarizing this literature, Sandy Baum and I
wrote:
Previous studies have estimated "manageable" debt levels based on the proportion of
starting income which can reasonably be devoted to repayment ... . The consensus of this
literature is that students graduating from college in the mid-1980's can be expected to
successfully manage debts up to between $5,000 and $8,000. Beyond these levels, debts
are thought to cause unreasonable burdens. 16
In the absence of survey data that included flows of both debt
repayment obligations and income, no calculation of the proportion of
former students facing unmanageable student loan debts could be
attempted. As a result, these studies were used primarily to advise
governments on where to set borrowing limits, and to advise students on
how much debt they might reasonably be able to repay.
B. Measuring Hardship Using Survey Data
A second group of studies turned to survey data that measured
the individual circumstances of particular borrowers. One way to
measure hardship in the survey data is simply to ask borrowers if they
are experiencing financial hardship as they repay their loans.
15 Andr6 Dani~re provides an early example of an effort made to develop a rough theoretical
indicator of the burden created by student loan repayment: see A. Dani~re, "The Benefits and Costs
of Alternative Federal Programs of Financial Aid to College Students" in The Economics and
Financing of Higher Education in the United States: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1969) 556. Danibre defines, at 577, what he considers to be a "comfortable repayment
stream." Using United States census data, he then assumes that the average person spends 90 per
cent of after-tax income on consumption goods (Le., food, shelter, and any other expenses that are
not "savings"). Of the remaining 10 per cent, Dani6re reasons, at 578, that one-quarter should be
spent on "securing life insurance, providing emergency funds, etc." The remaining 7.5 per cent of
after-tax income is described, at 578, as the "average 'comfortable' repayment amount." Dani~re
writes, at 576, that the amount of debt burden that is "tolerable" should be based on "a social
consensus of what constitutes tolerability." He undertook this calculation only to facilitate his
numerical simulations of debt burden. Other authors simply adopt the standards developed by
banks for extending credit. These include ratios of mortgage-debt service to pre-tax income in the
25 per cent range, and ratios of total-debt service to pre-tax income in the 40 per cent range.
16 S. Baum & S. Schwartz, The Impact of Student Loans on Borrowers: Consumption Patterns
and Attitudes Towards Repayment: Evidence from the New England Student Loan Survey (Boston:
Tufts University, 1988) at 17, n. 7 [hereinafter Impact of Student Loans].
The Dark Side of Student Loans
For example, Baum and I surveyed about 2,000 American
student loan borrowers who were in the repayment phase and whose
loans were guaranteed by the Massachusetts Higher Education
Assistance Corporation. Our analysis was specifically aimed at
investigating "the extent to which educational debt is burdensome for
borrowers ...."17
Baum and I asked several questions designed to elicit
respondents' subjective impressions of the burden of loan repayment.
We summarized the results of those questions as follows: "Based on the
responses, we estimate that approximately 30% [of the respondents]
perceive significant hardship resulting from their loan repayment. About
one-half of the respondents do not perceive measurable hardship."18
In the Canadian context, Ross Finnie and I used the NGS data to
analyze the burden of student loan repayment for Canadian borrowers
who had graduated from a post-secondary institution.19 The NGS asked
graduates who had student loans outstanding whether they felt that
repaying their student loans was a hardship. According to Finnie and I,
19 per cent of the male graduates and 26 per cent of the female
graduates reported hardship.20
Finnie and I also used the NGS data to examine the ratio of total
student debt to earnings.21 This ratio understated the true debt burden
facing the graduates for at least two reasons. First, debts other than
student loans were omitted (since they were not reported in the NGS).
Second, those who were not working were omitted (since they had no
earnings and, thus, had an undefined ratio of debt to earnings). For
those who received bachelor's degrees in 1990, the median debt-to-
17 Ibid at 3.
18 Jbia at 7.
19 See R. Finnie & S. Schwartz, Student Loans in Canada: Past, Present, and Future (Toronto:
C.D. Howe Institute, 1996) at 36-54 [hereinafter Student Loans in Canada]. The NGS surveyed those
who had graduated from Canadian post-secondary institutions in 1982, 1986, and 1990, a
particularly well-off group of borrowers. We know from studies of student loan default that default
rates are considerably lower among graduates than among non-graduates: see, for example, M.
Dynarski, "Who Defaults on Student Loans? Findings From the National Postsecondary Aid Study"
(1994) 13 Econ. Educ. Rev. 55 [hereinafter "Who Defaults on Student Loans?"]; and J.F. Volkwein
& B.P. Szelest, "Individual and Campus Characteristics Associated With Student Loan Default"
(1995) 36 Res. Higher Educ. 41.
20 Since 65 per cent of the survey respondents did not have any outstanding student loan debt,
Finnie and I suggest that, for those graduating from post-secondary institutions in the 1980s, student
loan repayment was a problem for only about 7-8 per cent of the borrowers: see Student Loans in
Canada, supra note 19 at 47.
21 Ideally, one would compare the flow of payments to the flow of income. The NGS, however,
contains only the total amount borrowed by each respondent and not their monthly repayments.
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earnings ratio was 0.28 for men and 0.32 for women. The ratios for other
degree types and other cohorts were somewhat lower.
As a rough indicator of the substantive magnitude of Finnie's
and my ratios, note that Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook estimated that
the median ratio of "total non-mortgage debt to income" for their
sample of American bankrupts was 0.7.22 The burden of student loans,
however, is probably lower than the burden of an equivalent amount of
"non-mortgage debt" because student loans are paid off over ten years
(rather than the two or three years that is typical of non-mortgage debt)
and, thus, requires smaller monthly payments.23
Another potential impact of a debt burden that is too heavy
would be the inability of former students to participate fully in life after
leaving school. Some have argued that if students face too high a debt
load upon leaving school, they will be forced to forego careers that are
not remunerative, to postpone marriage, to postpone having children,
or, in general, to be unable to participate fully in adult life.
Baum and I also asked our survey respondents if their loan
repayment obligations had affected home-ownership, car ownership, or
living apart from parents. At least in the United States, in 1988 (when
average total student loan debts were between US$6,000 and US$9,000),
repayment did not have any "significant impact on the actual
consumption patterns of borrowers." 24 Baum and I concluded that "[t]he
evidence strongly suggests ... that the loan payments are not significantly
affecting the ability of repayers to enjoy the consumption patterns
typical of similar borrowers without high loan payments."25
Borrowing levels in Canada and in the United States continue to
increase, and debt burdens continue to grow beyond the levels at which
either borrowers or analysts have any experience. Despite long-standing
and continuing concern about excessive debt burdens, students have
continued to borrow. Thus, any dire predictions of the consequences of
increased borrowing should at least be leavened with the knowledge that
past fears have not been realized.
22 See As We Foigive Our Debtors, supra note 13 at 206. In this calculation, only debtors who
were not self-employed and who were filing under Chapter 7 were included.
23 The literature on bankruptcy generally suggests (though without much theoretical or
empirical support) that a debt-to-earnings ratio of one (that is, a debt load equal to one year's
earnings) indicates that bankrupts "cannot pay" their debts.
24 Impact of Student Loans, supra note 16 at 12.
25 Ibid. at 14.
1999] The Dark Side of Student Loans 317
C. Measuring Hardship UsingAdministrative Data
For more than thirty years, government-guaranteed loans from
the CSLP have helped low-income students pay for their post-secondary
education.2 6 Low-income students are "high-risk" borrowers-with
limited labour market experience and limited access to collateral. Private
institutions are usually unwilling to make unsecured loans to such
borrowers. That reluctance, combined with the government's desire to
make post-secondary education accessible to all, regardless of family
income, was the rationale for providing the government guarantee.
The majority of student loan borrowers repaid their loans; the
loans of the minority who did not repay fell into default. For loans
negotiated before 1995, the government then made good on its
guarantee by paying a claim for loss to the lender.27 The borrower's debt,
however, was not discharged; "default" simply meant that the
responsibility for collection shifted from the lending institution to the
government.
As late as 1980, student loan default was not perceived as a great
problem in some quarters. At that point, about 9 per cent of CSLP
borrowers had defaulted on their loans.28 By 1990, however, the
proportion of borrowers who defaulted on their Canada Student Loans
had climbed to "one in six," 29 and the auditor general was quite
26 See Human Resources Development Canada, Ensuring Opportunities: Access to Post-
Secondary Education (Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada, 1998) [hereinafter
Ensuring Opportunities], online: Human Resources Development Canada <http://www.hrdc-
drhc.g.ca/studentjloans/postgraph/ va3_e. html> (date accessed: 11 September 1999), which states
that "[s]ince 1964, the federal government has provided over $15 billion in financial assistance to 2.7
million students under the Program."
27 Before a loan is formally categorized as in "default," the lender must verify that the loan
has a number of characteristics. Similarly, defaulted loans must have a number of characteristics
before the CSLP formally declares the value of a loan "lost." In this article, however, I adopt a less
formal notion of default and loss. A loan is in default if the lender has filed a claim for loss with the
cSLp, and the csLP has paid that claim.
28 See The Federal-Provincial Task Force on Student Assistance, Report of the Federal-
Provincial Task Force on Student Assistance (Toronto: Council of Ministers of Education, 1981) at
141, where the Task Force asserted that "[t]he amount ultimately requiring write-off to date is
about 1% of the value of default claims paid." However, this number does not seem justified by the
statistics included in the report. Nonetheless, the Task Force concluded, at 143, that "the existing
default rates on the CSLP and on provincial loans were not unduly out of line and did not point to
any particular weakness or problems with the concept or administration of the programs."
29 See Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of
Commons (Hull, Qc.: Supply and Services Canada, 1990) at 701 [hereinafter Report of the Auditor
General].
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concerned both about that rate and about the government's efforts to
reduce it.
Combining estimates of the rate of default and the rate of
repayment after default, Finnie and I estimate that between 10-12 per
cent of the dollar value of student loans was lost through default.30
Changes to the CSLP in the 1990s have significantly changed the
nature of the problem of student loan default. The federal government
does not guarantee CSLP loans negotiated after August 1995. Lending
institutions receive a payment of 5 per cent of the value of all loans
entering repayment-a payment called the "risk premium." In return for
the risk premium, the lending institutions bear the losses created by the
former students who fail to repay their loans. The loss rates on the
student loans made under this "risk-sharing" agreement will remain
unknown for some time yet.
The role of student loans in personal bankruptcy is even less well
documented. When Wayne Brighton and Justin Connidis studied those
seeking bankruptcy protection in 1977,31 student loan debt was not an
important element among the debts of those in their study sample. The
increase in borrowing over time, however, had an impact on this extreme
form of debt burden. According to the CSLP, the "cost to the federal
government for student loans in bankruptcy, has vaulted from $30
million in 1990-91 to $70 million in 1996-97."32
III. WHY DO STUDENTS DEFAULT?
Proposed causes of student loan default, according to a review of
the literature, seem to fall into three general categories: (1) the
defaulters' inability to pay; (2) the imperfect knowledge, or negative
attitudes, of some borrowers; and (3) the incentives for default created
by the program rules.
The evidence suggests that inability to pay is the most important
cause of default. This conclusion is based primarily on a number of
empirical studies that have demonstrated the strong relationship
between unemployment and low earnings on the one hand, and student
3 0 See Student Loans in Canada, supra note 19 at 17.
31 See J.W. Brighton & J.A. Connidis, Consumer Bankrupts in Canada (Ottawa: Consumer
and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1982).
32 Ensuring Opportunities, supra note 26, online: Human Resources Development Canada
<http://www. hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/studentloans/postgraph/va9.e.html#300> (date accessed: 16 August
1999).
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loan default on the other. I now briefly review the literature on each of
the three categories.
A. Borrowers'Inability to Pay
Since higher education is a risky investment, some former
students may end up working at jobs that pay no more than the jobs they
might have held without a post-secondary education. Some former
students are unable to find a job at all. These financial "losers" include
disproportionate numbers of those who dropped out without finishing a
degree, those who graduated without skills that were saleable in the
labour market, and those who were simply unlucky, never managing to
find steady and remunerative employment after leaving full-time studies.
These borrowers might be considered "can't pay" defaulters, as opposed
to "won't pay" defaulters, who default because of their unwillingness to
repay.33
What proportion of defaulters fall into the "can't pay" category?
Some evidence on this point is available from several academic studies
of default in the American Guaranteed Student Loan program, which
operated much like the CSLP did before the introduction of "risk-
sharing" in 1995. These studies exploit the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study (NPSAS), 34 which is a source of excellent data for
studying default. The NPSAS data contain (1) a variable indicating
whether individuals defaulted on their student loans; (2) a measure of
individual post-schooling earnings; (3) a set of variables capturing other
characteristics of the borrower; and (4) a set of variables that
characterize the borrower's educational institution.
If all defaulters were simply unwilling to repay their loans even
though they had the means to do so, then post-education earnings would
be uncorrelated with default. High-earning former students would be
just as likely to default as low-earning former students. If the opposite
were true-if all defaulters were willing to repay, but simply lacked the
33 This often-heard distinction between "can't pay" and "won't pay" defaulters reflects one of
the implicit moral judgements that accompany the policy debate about student loan default. It
implies a clear distinction between one group of honest, but unfortunate defaulters, and a second
group who knowingly abuse the system in order to avoid repayment. However, this distinction can
be quite blurry. Even an honest but unfortunate borrower, faced with severe financial difficulty,
must decide which payments must be made and which can be put off. Depending on the specific
circumstances, student loan repayment may not be at the top of the list for all borrowers.
34 For an overview of the NPSAS, see online: National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
<http:llnces.ed.gov/npsas/overviev.asp> (date accessed: 11 September 1999).
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means to do so-then earnings would be the decisive factor in
determining whether or not a borrower defaulted.
The studies based on the American data are quite clear. The
level of earnings is a statistically significant and substantively important
correlate of default. Those with low earnings are more likely to default
than those with high earnings. Mark Dynarski wrote that "earnings ...
[have a] major [impact] on the likelihood of defaulting." 35 He estimated
that a 1 per cent decline in earnings would lead to a 0.3 per cent increase
in the probability of default.36 J. Fredericks Volkwein and Bruce Szelest
wrote that "significant decreases in default probability are produced by
... current earnings."37 When the NPSAS directly asked defaulters why
they had defaulted, 73 per cent responded that they were "unemployed
and without income."38
As part of its recent evaluation of the CSLP, 39 Human Resources
Development Canada (HRDC) asked Goss Gilroy Inc. to survey a group
of CSLP borrowers.40 Using that survey, I found that earnings were even
more important in the Canadian context than in the American. Among
Canadian borrowers, a 1 per cent decline in earnings was estimated to
lead to a 0.8 per cent increase in the probability of default. 41
Further evidence on this point comes from the final report of the
committee reviewing the British Columbia Student Assistance Program,
which stated that "[tjhe Ministry of Finance's Loan Administration
Branch estimates that 30 per cent of student loan defaulters are able but
unwilling to pay. This leaves 70 per cent who are willing to pay but whose
circumstances are such that they cannot make the required payments." 42
35 "Who Defaults on Student Loans?," supra note 19 at 66.
36 Ibid
37 Volkwein & Szelest, supra note 19 at 57. In a second model estimated by Volkwein and
Szelest, current earnings seemed to have no effect on the probability of default (though other
variables related to earnings did affect default).
38 "Who Defaults on Student Loans?," supra note 19 at 63.
39 See Evaluation: Final Report, supra note 1.
40 See Human Resources Development Canada, The Survey of Borrowers (1997)
[unpublished].
41 See S. Schwartz, "The Determinants of Default on Loans From the Canada Student Loans
Program" (1997) [unpublished, on file with author] [hereinafter Determinants of Default]. This
report was part of an evaluation of the Canada Student Loan Program conducted by Goss Gilroy
Inc. on behalf of HRDC: see Evaluation" Final Report, supra note 1.
42 British Columbia, Review of B.C. Student Assistance and Barriers to Post-Secondary
Participation: Final Report (Victoria: Ministry of Advanced Education, Training and Technology,
1992) at 32 [hereinafter Review of B.C. Student Assistance]. Some loans fall into default because the
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In 1990, the auditor general wrote that 44 per cent of defaulters who
were contacted refused to cooperate, perhaps reflecting an unwillingness
to repay.43 However, the dichotomy of "cooperate" versus "refuse to
cooperate" is not the same as "able to pay" and "unable to pay."
B. Knowledge and Attitudes
Despite this clear result suggesting that many students default
because they cannot repay their loans, post-education earnings were not
the only correlate of default in any of the empirical studies. Two other
factors seem to be that borrowers are either confused about their
repayment obligations or that borrowers simply refuse to repay. Many
students are relatively young and, therefore, without long experience in
credit relationships. Their knowledge about student financial assistance
seems to be quite limited. In British Columbia, "[a] 1991 survey of 3,500
high school completers and first year post-secondary students reported
that approximately half of the participants were dissatisfied with their
knowledge of student financial assistance."44
Some of the borrowers' confusion about student borrowing may
be related to the nature and circumstances in which it occurs. The
process of applying for, and receiving, student financial assistance is
closely linked with the process of attending school, rather than being a
separate and discrete activity. Unlike consumer loans, student loans are
not tied directly to the purchase of tangible consumer goods and no
repayment is demanded until the end of full-time studies. Indeed, there
is little contact with the lender for potentially long periods while the
student is engaged in full-time studies.45 As a result, some students may
not even know (or may not remember) that part of their financial aid
package was, in fact, a loan that must be repaid.
According to what little has been written on this subject, many
students are unaware of the details of their borrowing, and some
students are even unaware that they are borrowing. As Judy Dyck wrote:
lenders have not been able to locate borrowers after they have left full-time studies (and because
those same borrowers either neglected to contact their lenders or did not know that this was
required). The estimate that 70 per cent of defaulters are in the "can't pay" category would seem to
include defaulters whose willingness to repay is unknown.
43 See Report of theAuditor General, supra note 29 at 702.
4 4 Review of B.C. Student Assistance, supra note 42 at 37.
45 Students have contact with their lenders only when they file a form indicating that they are
continuing their studies (and are still eligible for the interest subsidy), or if they apply for another
loan.
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Individual students have little awareness of the niceties of federal/provincial jurisdictions
and the extent to which they are being affected by federal regulations, provincial
regulations, or by provincial interpretations of federal regulations. They respond to the
adequacy of the total "aid package" in meeting their needs, and whether that package is
delivered to them in an effective manner. 46
The transition into loan repayment may also be mysterious to
students. After leaving school, borrowers must make arrangements with
the lenders to consolidate their loans and to begin repayment. Many
borrowers never make such arrangements and quickly fall into default.
The University of Alberta Students' Union wrote that "[l]ittle
information is provided to students regarding the consolidation process.
In fact, [most] students only realize the commitment and what exactly
the repayment structure means [when] they are consolidating [their]
loans." 47
Another common perception is that borrower attitudes are
related to student loan default. Despite that perception, there has been
no systematic study of borrower attitudes toward student loan default.
C. Incentives for Default Created by Program Rules
Lending under the CSLP involves a complicated partnership
among the federal government, the provincial governments, post-
secondary schools, and the lending institutions. This situation is in stark
contrast to the simpler relationship between private borrowers and
lenders. The complexity of the CSLP partnership, as it evolved in the
thirty years prior to the 1995 risk-sharing agreement, resulted in a long
list of program rules that govern the rights and obligations of each of the
parties to the loan.
Four kinds of rules were potentially important in affecting
default rates: (1) eligibility rules that determined how much students are
allowed to borrow; (2) rules determining the diligence with which banks
sought repayment; (3) rules influencing the extent to which banks
allowed flexibility in repayment; and (4) rules that specify the
consequences of default for the defaulting students.
46 J. Dyck, Consequences of Increased Student Borrowing and Implications for Public Policy on
Higher Education (M.Ed. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1995) at 62 [unpublished].
4 7 University of Alberta Students' Union, Making Ends Meet: Student Finances at the University
of Alberta: A Submission to the Senate Task Force on Student Finance (Edmonton: University of
Alberta Students' Union, 1992) at 13.
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1. Eligibility rules
For CSLP loans, the rules determining eligibility are set by the
federal government in consultation with provincial governments, and are
based on students' assessed need (the difference between estimated
resources and anticipated costs) rather than any potential "ability to
repay." In fact, part of the rationale for government intervention is that
many students who might benefit from higher education lack earnings
and assets-and consequently cannot demonstrate an "ability to repay."
Making loans to such young people fosters equality of opportunity.
However, the policy of lending without regard to ability to repay
is likely the root cause of at least some defaulted loans. The large loans
that represent "equal opportunity" to some are evidence of "lender
irresponsibility" to others. Where a private lender might be driven out of
business by a policy of lending large amounts of money to individuals
who can show no ability to repay, a government may be able to pass on
any resulting losses to its taxpayers.
2. Due diligence rules
Under the terms of the federal government's guarantee of CSLP
loans issued before August 1995, banks could make a claim for
reimbursement if its efforts to collect on the loan were unsuccessful.
There were, however, rules defining the "due diligence" required of the
lenders before a default claim would be approved. Due diligence
required that banks try to find delinquent borrowers before filing a
default claim. However, the bank needed only to send registered letters
to the borrower's last known address. If there was no response to these
letters, the bank could ask the government to make good on its
guarantee, sending the borrower into default.
The certainty of the government guarantee, combined with the
relatively small size of student loans and the below-market interest rates
they carried, would seem to have diminished the banks' enthusiasm for
pursuing delinquent borrowers. The auditor general was quite damning
in this regard: "Our audit found that, in the majority of cases, banks have
made little effort to encourage repayment by students." 48
48 Report of the Auditor General, supra note 29 at 701.
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Some evidence of the importance of the due diligence rule
comes from the 1997 evaluation of the CSLp.4 9 Since the name of the
lender was known, it could be determined if default rates varied across
lenders, holding constant the characteristics of the borrowers. It was
found that "despite the similarity in [the] borrower profiles, borrowers
who used one particular lender ... had higher probabilities of default."O
Thus, it is possible that lenders varied in their inclination to file claims
for loss.
3. Lack of flexible repayment plans
Prior to the recent reforms, the repayment terms of a CSLP loan
required fixed monthly payments for a maximum of 114 months.
However, according to the report of the Ministerial Task Force on
Youth, a young university graduate might now take up to two years
before settling into a career-track job linked to the graduate's education
and interests.51 For those who have outstanding student loans, the
combination of an unsteady income and an inflexible monthly loan
payment created the potential for default.
The committee reviewing the British Columbia Student
Assistance Program wrote:
Unemployment and underemployment make it difficult for many to meet the inflexible
payment provisions of the Canada and B.C. Student Loan Programs. Many in-person and
written submissions to the committee came from students wanting to meet their
obligations but feeling forced into default-some into personal bankruptcy-by the size
of their student loans and the repayment requirements. 52
4. Consequences of default
If students suffered financial hardship after defaulting upon their
student loan, it might conceivably deter other borrowers from going into
default. Alternatively, if the consequences of default were minimal-if
49 See Evaluation: Final Report, supra note 1.
5 0 Determinants of Default, supra note 41 at 16.
51 See Human Resources Development Canada, Ministerial Task Force on Youth, Take On
the Future: Canadian Youth in the World of Work; Report-Ministerial Task Force on Youth (Ottawa:
Human Resources Development Canada, 1996) at 4.
5 2 Review of B.C. Student Assistance, supra note 42 at 32.
1999] The Dark Side of Student Loans
borrowers could "get away" without repaying their student loan-future
defaults might be encouraged.
Defaulted loans were typically turned over to commercial
collection agencies, which then tried to track down the borrowers and
establish a repayment schedule. Sometimes the collection agencies
needed only minimal efforts to find the borrowers. Once found, some
borrowers were more than willing to begin repayment. In other cases,
borrowers could not be found without greater efforts than the collection
agency (and csLP) thought economically warranted. In still other cases,
borrowers were located, but either refused or were unable to repay.
Aside from the unpleasantness of being the target of sometimes
aggressive collection efforts, borrowers did not suffer greatly as a
consequence of default. Before 1991, the fact that a borrower had
defaulted on his or her student loan was not reported to any of the
commercial credit bureaus that determine the "credit rating" for
potential borrowers. As a result, other borrowing by defaulters was
simply not affected by their student loan default.
IV. THE SITUATION OF BANKRUPTS WITH
STUDENT LOANS AMONG THEIR DEBTS
In 1997, the Office of Consumer Affairs of Industry Canada
commissioned a survey of over 1,000 debtors who sought bankruptcy
protection between mid-March and early May of that year.5 3 The survey
responses were then combined with information contained in the
Statement of Affairs, an official form summarizing the financial position
of the debtors. The research project was intended to help understand the
causes of consumer insolvency in Canada.
For this article, I use the resulting survey data to compare the
economic status of the bankrupts who have student loans among their
debts to that of the overall sample. Two sub-groups of student loan
borrowers can be defined in the survey: (1) the group of 262 individuals
who had student loans among the liabilities listed on their Statements of
Affairs; and (2) the group of 183 individuals who either said that student
loans "triggered" their bankruptcy, or who had student loan liabilities
whose dollar value was more than 50 per cent of their total debt.
In the discussion that follows, these two groups are compared to
the complete sample of potential bankrupts and, where possible, to the
entire Canadian population. The picture that emerges is unequivocal. As
53 See Empiical Study, supra note 2.
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a group, bankrupts who are also student loan borrowers are in worse
economic shape than the larger group of bankrupts. They are more
likely to have very low household incomes and more likely to have
depended on government transfers. They are not, in general, young
professionals; many have no post-secondary credentials at all.54
A. Demographic Characteristics
Since widespread student loan borrowing in Canada is largely a
phenomenon of the 1990s, it is not surprising that those with student
loans among their debts are quite a bit younger than other bankrupts.
More than one-half (57.3 per cent) of those with student loans among
their debts were under thirty, as opposed to only 32 per cent of all
bankrupts. Those whose student loans were critical to their bankruptcy
were younger-62.8 per cent were under thirty.55
Unlike other forms of credit, there are no obvious gender
differences in student loan lending. Women are just as likely to go on to
post-secondary education, and are just as likely to borrow from student
loan programs. There are, however, gender differences in the ability of
borrowers to repay student loans-differences that arise from the fact
that women earn less, on average, than men, even when education is
held constant. Thus, women end up with the same loan obligations but
lower earnings. As a result, while 40 per cent of the full sample of
bankrupts were women, over 60 per cent of those with student loans
were women.
Given that student loans are made available only to individuals
who enrol in designated post-secondary programs, it comes as no
surprise that those with student loans among their liabilities are better
educated than the overall group of survey respondents. Only 14.5 per
cent reported a completed level of education of high school or less,
compared to 47.2 per cent of the overall sample.56 About 45 per cent
had a post-secondary credential (split roughly equally between those
54 One could argue that their economic situation might improve in the future-they are both
younger and better educated than the overall group. However, there is no evidence of that future
prosperity in their past history.
55 These figures are based upon calculations from the Survey of Potential Bankrupts, supra
note 2.
56 The figure of 14.5 per cent presumably represents those who did not complete the post-
secondary program in which they enrolled.
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with university and college degrees). The remaining 40 per cent reported
having "some" post-secondary education but no completed degree.
The distribution of marital status of the overall group was quite
different from the marital status of those with student loans. Those with
student loans were much more likely to be single. In both groups, among
those who were not single, there was a high proportion who were
divorced or separated. Finally, the overall group was somewhat more
likely to have dependants (including both children and dependant
adults).
The socio-economic picture of those with student loans is of a
group that contained more women, and was younger and better
educated than the group of all bankrupts. Looking at these
characteristics alone (apart from the relatively high proportion of
"formerly married" individuals), the group with student loans looks
much like any group of similar-aged Canadians. The similarity ends
there, however, as an examination of their economic situation shows.
B. The Economic Situation of Bankrupts With Student Loan Debt
The survey asked respondents to state their pre-tax annual
household income. Bankrupts with student loans had even lower
incomes than the already low incomes of all bankrupts. Not surprisingly,
the $24,000 median income for all bankrupts was considerably lower
than the median for all Canadians of $37,130.57 The median income for
those with student loans among their debts was only $14,000, while the
median income for those whose student loans were critical to their
bankruptcy was still lower, at $12,000. Indeed, 80 per cent of the latter
group had household incomes lower than the $24,000 median of all
bankrupts.
On their Statements of Affairs, bankrupts report their monthly
income and expenses. As was the case with annual income, those with
student loans were worse off than the group of all bankrupts. The
median total monthly income of the full sample was $1,400, while those
with student loans had a median of $1,200, and those whose student
loans were critical to their bankruptcy had a median monthly income of
only $1,071.
57 See S. Schwartz, "The Empirical Dimensions of Consumer Bankruptcy: Results From a
Survey of Canadian Bankrupts" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83 at 97, Table 3.
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It may be useful to compare these median levels of monthly
income to the eligibility thresholdsS8 for the federal CSLP Interest Relief
Program (IRP), which is available to CSLP borrowers with low incomes.
The lowest Interest Relief monthly income threshold is $1,472, and
applies to a single person, living alone, whose monthly CSLP payment is
less than $25. The eligibility threshold is higher for those with larger
families or larger CSLP payments. Two-thirds of those with student loans
among their debts reported total monthly incomes of less than $1,472; if
family size and the size of CSLP loan payments could be factored in, that
proportion would undoubtedly be much higher.
The Statement of Affairs contains the occupation of those
seeking bankruptcy. If the person is not working for pay, that
information is reported in the space provided for the occupation. For the
majority of the sample, occupational information was therefore
available, and can be compared to that reported for Canada as a whole.
Occupational information is often summarized by scales that
attempt to measure "occupational prestige," with "self-employed
professionals," "employed professionals," and "high-level managers" at
one extreme, and with unskilled workers near the other extreme. A
common scale used with Canadian data is called the Pineo-Porter-
McRoberts scale.59 This scale has sixteen categories, ranging from self-
employed professionals to farm labourers. For the purposes of this
article, I have collapsed the upper three categories-self-employed and
employed professionals, and high-level managers-into a category
labelled "high prestige." The lower three categories-unskilled clerical
workers, unskilled manual labourers, and farm labourers-are collapsed
into a single "low prestige" category. The remaining categories are
combined into a "medium prestige" category.
In the full survey sample, 33.4 per cent were in the low prestige
category (see Table 1, below). Despite their greater education, those
with student loans among their liabilities, and those whose student loans
were critical to their bankruptcy, had even higher proportions in
unskilled occupations (37.6 per cent and 34.8 per cent, respectively) than
either the Canadian population or the group of all bankrupts.
In the full sample, 4.7 per cent were employed in occupations at
the top of the occupational prestige scale. In the two groups with student
58 See Canada Student Financial Assistance Regulations, S.O.R./95-329, Sch. I [hereinafter
CSFA Regulations].
59 See P.C. Pineo, J. Porter & H.A. McRoberts, "The 1971 Census and the Socioeconomic
Classification of Occupations" (1977) 14 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anth. 91.
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loans, the proportions employed in these more prestigious occupations
were higher, at 6.8 and 7.6 per cent, respectively.
TABLE 1
OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE OF DEBTORS
FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY
Occupational All Full Those With Those Whose
Prestige Category Canadians Survey Student Loans Student Loans
Sample Among Debts Were Critical
(%) (%) (%) (%)
High Prestige 12.5 4.7 6.8 7.6
Medium Prestige 66.5 66.8 62.4 57.7
Low Prestige 21.1 33.4 37.6 34.8
One of the striking findings by myself and Leigh Anderson6O was
the extent to which those seeking personal bankruptcy had been reliant
on government transfers at some point in the two years prior to filing for
bankruptcy. As Table 2, below, shows, 27.1 per cent had received income
assistance within the two previous years. Those numbers are even higher
for the sub-group that had student loans. More than 40 per cent of those
with student loans had been on income assistance within the past two
years-41.2 per cent for those with student loans among their debts, and
44.8 per cent for those whose student loans were critical to their
bankruptcy. In addition, about 30 per cent of all three groups had
received unemployment insurance benefits.61 In the full sample, 47.6 per
cent had received either income assistance or unemployment benefits.
The corresponding percentages for the two groups of student loan
borrowers were 56.5 per cent and 61.7 per cent, respectively.
We might consider participation in these programs as an
independent indication of economic difficulty. Another such indicator is
whether the person had sought further credit and had been turned down,
presumably because the lender felt that the potential borrower lacked
the ability to repay a new loan. Almost one-third of the full sample had
been turned down for credit within the past two years (see Table 2); a
slightly higher proportion of those with student loans had been turned
down for further credit.
60 See Empirical Study, supra note 2.
61 The federal Unemployment Insurance (ul) program is now known as the Employment
Insurance (El) program.
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TABLE 2
OTHER INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY
WITHIN THE PAST TWO YEARS
Full Those With Those Whose
Survey Student Loans Student Loans
Sample Among Debts Were Critical
(%) (%) (%)
Per Cent Receiving
Income Assistance (IA) 27.1 41.2 44.8
Per Cent Receiving
Unemployment Insurance (uI) 30.3 29.8 32.2
Per Cent Receiving
Either IA or UI 47.6 56.5 61.7
Per Cent Turned Down
For Credit 31.8 35.5 38.3
C. Summary
The economic situation of all those declaring bankruptcy
suggests that bankruptcy is used primarily as a last resort. The economic
situation of those seeking bankruptcy protection with student loans
among their debts, or whose student loans were critical in their
bankruptcy, is even worse than the already desperate situation of the
whole group. To be sure, they are younger and have more education, but
they have lower annual household income and lower monthly income at
the time of filing for bankruptcy. More than 40 per cent had received
income assistance in the two years previous to filing, and about 30 per
cent had received unemployment insurance. A surprisingly large
proportion-more than one-third-had occupations that were unskilled.
V. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES THAT RELATE
TO STUDENT LOAN BORROWERS
Recent legislation has introduced a number of changes to the
process by which student loans are repaid. Of most interest-and most
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surprising to those involved with personal bankruptcy-was the
provision in the 1998 federal budget that announced the government's
intention to make student loans non-dischargeable for a period of ten
years after the completion of full-time studies.62 Just a few months
earlier, and after a long series of consultations, a series of amendments
to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) had been passed by
Parliament.63 One of the amendments introduced a two-year "waiting
period," following the end of full-time studies, during which student
loans could not be discharged. 64
The unanticipated introduction of a ten-year waiting period, so
soon after the introduction of the two-year waiting period, led to
protests by insolvency professionals-represented by the Canadian Bar
Association (CBA) and the Canadian Insolvency Practitioners
Association (C¢UA)-who felt that the results of the lengthy consultations
had been unwisely disregarded. Why might the government have
implemented this new ten-year waiting period? No answer to this
question has been made public, but some speculation may be in order.
First, the ten-year waiting period, if it does nothing else, will
bring an end to stories of young professionals, just out of school,
brazenly declaring bankruptcy in order to have their student loans
discharged. It may not have mattered that the number of such cases was
extremely small, or that judges had the discretion to order only
conditional discharge of student loan debt.65
Second, other changes to the CSLP loan repayment programs,
discussed below, were introduced at the same time. These changes seem
to have been intended to create a situation in which bankruptcy was
62 See Budget Implementation Act, 1998, S.C. 1998, c. 21, s. 103 [hereinafter Budget
Implementation Act], amending Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 178
[hereinafter nm].
63 See An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1997, c. 12.
64 Ibid. s. 105(2). The arguments for making student loans non-dischargeable are rarely stated
explicitly. Some have argued, presumably against discharge, that student loans finance an
investment in human capital that cannot be repossessed. Another argument is that the discharge of
student loans leads to a loss of public funds and, for that reason, should not be lightly granted.
Lurking in the background is the undocumented assertion that some student loan
borrowers-perhaps young lawyers, accountants, doctors, and dentists-are abusing the BItA by
seeking the discharge of their student loans just after leaving school, and before their earnings have
risen to what they will later be.
65 In most consumer bankruptcy cases, a bankruptcy judge decides, nine months after the
debtor has filed for bankruptcy, whether or not to grant a full discharge of debts. In the case of
student loan debt, it was not uncommon for judges to require that debtors pay a percentage of the
debt as a condition for the discharge of other debts.
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unnecessary for those with student loans-to be sure, if a potential
bankrupt's only debts were CSLP loans, bankruptcy would rarely be
necessary. It is, however, unusual to find debtors whose only debts are to
the CSLP.6 6 Other debtors, as the CBA and CIPA representatives pointed
out in their Senate testimony, may simply be forced to return to the
bankruptcy court, ten years after a first bankruptcy, seeking to have the
remaining balances on their student loans-both federal and
provincial-discharged.
For a number of reasons, the possibility of saving public funds
was probably not a major consideration. The financial cost of the other
changes will far exceed the value of the student debt that would have
been discharged through bankruptcy. As well, just because student loan
debt now survives bankruptcy does not mean that the loans will be
repaid. Moreover, in the wake of the risk-sharing agreements of the
early 1990s, loan losses are not, by and large, borne by government. As
such, it is the lenders who would benefit from these hypothetically
greater loan repayments, not the public coffers.
Regardless of the government's rationale for introducing the ten-
year waiting period, the empirical evidence presented above suggests
that most of those seeking bankruptcy protection with student loans
among their debts have very low incomes and no guarantee of higher
future incomes. Waiting ten years is not only unlikely to change their
economic situation, but will deny them the "fresh start" that is one of the
aims of the BIA. In my view, a waiting period, whether of two or ten'years,
is neither necessary nor desirable.
The waiting periods also violate one of the principles that have
guided the BIA reform process, on-going since 1992. As the CBA and CIPA
representatives made clear, great efforts had been made to reduce the
extent to which any one kind of creditor received special treatment
under the BiA. By creating special provisions for student loans owed to
commercial banks and governments, the 1998 changes move away from
this goal.
Supposing that deletion of the waiting period from the BIA is not
in the cards, one way forward is to push for the introduction of a
"hardship" clause that would allow judges to shorten the ten-year
66 Among the 1,018 debtors in the Survey of Potential Bankrupts, supra note 2, 14 had only
student loan debts: see Empirical Study, supra note 2. The federal-provincial composition of the
debts cannot be determined from the Statements of Affairs, so we do not know if any of the 14
debtors had only CSLP loans.
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waiting period if the borrower is experiencing substantial hardship.67
There is even a natural starting point for defining "substantial hardship":
that the borrower has participated in the CSLP Interest Relief Program
(IRP), but still shows no signs of being able to repay.
The lengthening of the period during which student loans would
be non-dischargeable was only one of a number of changes, most of
which were aimed at lightening the burden of student loan repayment by
providing more relief to those with low incomes. These included (1)
expanding the range of borrowers eligible for the IRP and increasing the
amount of relief available; (2) providing for a measure of loan
forgiveness to CSLP borrowers who exhaust their eligibility for interest
relief and who still have difficulty making payments; (3) creating federal
tax credits for interest paid on both federal and provincial student loans;
and (4) establishing two new grant programs.
Two features of the Canadian student loan system should be
kept in mind as these changes are discussed. The first is that there are
two kinds of student loans: loans made as part of the CSLP, and loans
made under provincial student loans programs. Most student loan
borrowers have loans from both federal and provincial programs, but the
changes to the IRP and the introduction of loan forgiveness apply only to
CSLP loans and not to provincial loans. The provincial loan programs
have their own debt relief programs, which tend to involve loan
forgiveness more than interest relief.68
Second, CSLP loans made after August 1995 are largely the
responsibility of the private banks, which had accepted a 5 per cent "risk
premium" in return for bearing the responsibility of debt collection.
Several provincial loan programs have also negotiated "risk-sharing"
agreements similar to that of the CSLP. The provision of publicly-funded
interest relief to student loan borrowers (and the extension of non-
67 Such a clause already exists in the American bankruptcy process. There, no discharge of
student loans is allowed within seven years of the end of studies unless the borrower can
demonstrate substantial hardship.
68 On-going federal-provincial negotiations are aimed at creating a single, combined federal
and provincial loan program. In the spring of 1999, the federal government and the governments of
Ontario and New Brunswick signed agreements that foresee a "Harmonized Student Loan"
program in place for the 2000-2001 academic year. The agreement "creates a single loan, and
streamlines administration for loans in a manner that simplifies financial assistance for student
borrowers": see Human Resources Development Canada, News Release 99-44, "The Government
of Canada and the Government of Ontario Harmonize Student Loans" (4 May 1999); and Human
Resources Development Canada, News Release 99-43 "The Government of Canada and the
Government of New Brunswick Harmonize Student Loans" (4 May 1999). Under those agreements,
interest relief will be extended to all student loan borrowers, and loan forgiveness (called "debt
reduction in repayment") will be considered in some circumstances.
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dischargeability from two to ten years) may give substantial benefits to
student loan lenders, rather than to the government.69
A. Changes to the CSLP Interest Relief Program
and "Debt Reduction"for CSLP Loans
While student loan borrowers are in school, the federal
government pays the interest on their CSLP loans. As soon as the student
leaves school, the interest subsidy stops and interest begins to
accumulate. Upon leaving school, however, borrowers are allowed a six-
month grace period during which no repayments are required.
The IRP is available to borrowers who are trying to pay back their
CSLP loans and who have low income.7 0 Initially, borrowers are eligible
for three months of interest relief; borrowers must apply for additional
three-month extensions as necessary. While on interest relief, borrowers
make no debt payments; when their eligibility for the program comes to
an end, the amount of principal owed is unchanged from when they
entered. Since 1995, the IRP has been managed by the private lenders on
behalf of the government, as part of the "risk-sharing" agreement
described above.
Historically, the IRP has not been widely used. In the 1997 Goss
Gilroy survey of student loan defaulters, only one-third of them had
even heard of the program. 71 Now that the program is managed by
lenders who have no government guarantee of repayment, the use of the
IRP is expected to become much more widespread.
Prior to the 1998 changes, the IRP was available to eligible CSLP
borrowers for up to thirty months within the first five years of
repayment. 72 The Budget Implementation Act of 1998 repealed the
provision that restricted the availability of interest relief to the first five
69 Several caveats apply to that general statement. Some provincial loans are still guaranteed
by the provincial governments so that the provincial government is being given special
consideration. In the same way, the private banks can "give back" a small proportion of bad csL'
loans to the federal government, which then becomes the creditor.
70 The definition of "low income" depends on both the monthly repayments due on the CSLP
loans and on family size.
71 See Evaluation: Final Study, supra note 1.
72 See CSFA Regulations, supra note 58, s. 20(2).
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years of the repayment period,73 which typically lasts for ten years after
the borrower leaves school. The IRP is now available over the entire
repayment period.74 If borrowers exhaust the thirty months of interest
relief and are still not in a position to repay their loans, interest relief
can now be extended for up to another twenty-four months.75
In addition, starting in April 1997, the eligibility-defining income
thresholds were increased by 9 per cent, making more borrowers eligible.
For those with income below the now higher thresholds, partial interest
relief will be introduced in 1999. Depending on income, the CSLP will pay
75 per cent, 50 per cent, or 25 per cent of the interest.
The overall impact of these changes, in theory, is to make the IRP
more generous. The monthly dollar outlay for csLP loan repayments
should be more sensitive to the borrower's income. The practical impact
of the changes depends on how they are implemented and on whether
borrowers avail themselves of the program.
Several provinces-most notably Ontario-have student loan
forgiveness programs. If the amount borrowed exceeds a certain level,
the portion in excess of that level is forgiven. In Ontario, as of 1999, any
amount borrowed before the 1998-1999 academic year from the CSLP and
the Ontario loan program totalling over $7,000 in any one year is
forgiven if the borrower applies to the debt remission program. 76
Effective on 1 August 1998, the CsLP introduced a measure of
loan forgiveness known as "debt reduction in repayment." If a borrower
has exhausted all the aid available from the IRP, and if the payments due
on the CSLP loans exceed 15 per cent of income, then part of their CSLP
loan-the smaller of $10,000 or 50 per cent of the principal-can be
forgiven.
These changes to the IRP, and the introduction of a measure of
loan forgiveness, have the welcome effect of introducing a larger
73 See Budget Implementation Act, supra note 62, s. 99, repealing Canada Student Financial
Assistance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-23, s. 9; and Regulations Amending the Canada Student Financial
Assistance Regulations, S.O.R./98-402, s. 3(3) [hereinafter CSFA Regulations Amendments], repealing
CSFA Regulations, supra note 58, s. 20(3).
74 See CFSA Regulations Amendments, supra note 73, s. 3.
75 Another of the 1998 changes was that lenders may be asked to extend the repayment
period-from ten to fifteen years-for borrowers participating in the IRP who are experiencing
severe difficulty in repayment. This would have the effect of reducing monthly student loan
payments (although increasing the total amount paid). It is unclear, at this point, how this provision
will be implemented.
76 See Ministry of Education and Training, "Ontario Student Opportunity Grant" in OSAP:
Ontario Student Assistance Program Application and Guide for Full-time Students 1999-2000
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1999) 17.
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measure of income sensitivity to the student loan repayment process.
That income sensitivity acknowledges the importance of low earnings in
creating problems for those in repayment.
At least theoretically, the institution of a student loan system in
which repayment is fully income contingent (as are the student loan
systems in Australia and New Zealand) would have been even more
welcome. However, such a change-once proposed as part of former
Minister of Human Resources Development Lloyd Axworthy's package
of social security reforms-seems politically impossible, given
widespread student opposition, the lack of provincial enthusiasm, and
the 1995 introduction of "risk-sharing" by the CSLP. In that context, the
1998 changes to the IRP and the federal loan forgiveness measures may
have been the only feasible steps in the direction of income-contingent
loan repayment.
Despite the increased income sensitivity of the CSLP programs,
however, there will still be borrowers who are unable to repay their
student loans. Some will be borrowers who have loans from provincial
programs that are not covered by CSLP interest relief. Others will be
borrowers who exhaust their five years of interest relief eligibility and
have their debts reduced, but who are still unable to pay the remaining
outstanding balances. If economic growth continues, these borrowers
may be few in number; if not, more loans may have to be forgiven.
B. Tax Credits forAll Student Loan Borrowers
The only new provision that applies to all student loans, as
opposed only to CSLP loans, is that all borrowers will be eligible for a
federal tax credit, beginning in the 1998 tax year, on interest payments
made on their federal and provincial student loans. As with all non-
refundable tax credits, this credit will provide limited benefits to those
most in need of help because those with low incomes will not have
incomes high enough to benefit from the tax credit. Many of the
borrowers who will take advantage of the new credit will have relatively
little need for it because their loan repayment is not causing great
hardship. Thus, the new tax credit has the opposite effect of traditional
income-contingent repayment plans: those with higher incomes pay less
because only they can take advantage of the tax credit.
The cost of the new provision is indirect-the tax revenues lost
because of the tax credit might have been redirected to the minority who
experience financial hardship. In particular, the eligibility thresholds for
interest relief could have been increased by more than 9 per cent; more
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than five years of eligibility could have been provided; and the level of
debt reduction could have been increased. Still, having made the
programs for borrowers with low incomes more generous, it is hard to
criticize the government for providing what will certainly be politically
popular aid to borrowers across the income spectrum.
C. New Grant Programs
One way to reduce the burden of student loan debt repayment is
to reduce the need to borrow in the first place. In the 1998 federal
budget, two new grant programs were created that will presumably
reduce some students' need to borrow.
Canada Study Grants (that incorporate the grants known as
Special Opportunity Grants) will operate under the aegis of the CSLP and
provide up to $3,000 per year to about 25,000 students with dependant
children. The amount of the grant will depend on financial need
demonstrated through the standard needs-analysis procedures. These
grants will be available beginning in August 1998. The second new grant
program, called Canada Millennium Scholarships, will operate through a
separate foundation and will grant up to $3,000 to about 100,000
students.
These new grant programs are quite welcome, since they will
reduce the need of some low-income students to borrow and, thus,
reduce the later burden of debt repayment for them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many students now leave school owing substantial amounts of
money-money borrowed from financial institutions under rules
specified by federal and provincial governments. Increased student loan
borrowing began in the first half of the 1990s; as the borrowers leave
school in the second half of the decade, the increased burden of
repayment is becoming clearer.
Even among borrowers who are post-secondary graduates (as
opposed to those who borrowed but did not complete their programs),
the proportion of those reporting significant hardship in repaying their
loans is fairly high (between 20-30 per cent of borrowers).77 CSLP loan
77 See Student Loans in Canada, supra note 19 at 46. See also note 20, supra, and
accompanying text.
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loss rates, prior to the 1995 decision to shift the default risk to lenders,
were in the 10-12 per cent range. 78 The rise in the number and
proportion of Canadians declaring bankruptcy with student loans among
their debts was also a clear danger signal.
The overall thrust of recent legislative changes as they affected
the student loan repayment process was quite positive because of the
provision of increased income sensitivity. These changes acknowledged
the empirical findings indicating that most student loan borrowers who
have difficulty in repaying their loans fall into the "can't pay" category,
rather than the "won't pay" category.
The creation of a waiting period during which student loans
cannot be discharged through bankruptcy, however, was both
unfortunate and unnecessary. The two-year waiting period introduced in
the 1997 amendments to the BIA was bad enough, but the ten-year period
introduced by the 1998 federal budget made the situation still worse.
Former students in need of a fresh start will be denied it, and particular
creditors-the banks that lend to students-will have been given an
advantage denied to other creditors.
On-going negotiation may soon lead to the harmonization of the
federal and provincial student loan programs. A harmonized program
would certainly streamline the current set of confusing and overlapping
loan programs. Hopefully, a harmonized program would adopt the
income sensitive features that are currently embedded in both programs.
Also looming on the horizon is the renegotiation of the contract
between the CSLP and the student loan lenders. Apparently, the lenders
are asking for a large increase in the payments made to them by the CSLP
in return for their assumption of most of the risk of loan default. The
current arrangement already gives the banks substantial concessions,
including a 5 per cent up-front payment, the ability to "give back"
another 5 per cent of non-performing loans, a generous Interest Relief
Program that pays interest to the banks when their borrowers cannot
pay, and the ten-year waiting period before discharge of the debt
through bankruptcy. As such, the CSLP would be wise to look askance at
any request for even more generous terms.
78 See Student Loans in Canada, supra note 19 at 17.
